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NOTE DE L’ÉDITEUR
Translated from the French original by Nick Oates
1 IN  MANY  respects,  the  dynamism  of  China’s  economic  growth  represents  a  huge
challenge  for  the  social  sciences.  Unlike  Western  capitalism,  the  economy  and  in
particular the private sector over the last ten years have developed in the absence of a
coherent corpus of laws regulating the systems and transfers of property ownership. In
another  paradox,  some  analysts  have  held  the  view  that  China  has  followed  a
development model inspired by the experiences of its Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese
neighbours,  but  the  hypothesis  of  a  “developmentalist”  central  Chinese  state  is
contradicted by the variety of local situations and the distance that separates them
from the directives formulated at the central level. The works of Adam Segal and Kellee
S. Tsai both offer important responses to the challenge presented by the Chinese case
to classical analyses of economic development.
2 The  object  of  Adam Segal’s  study  is  the  high-technology  enterprises  under  private
management  (the  minban or  minying  kejiqiye).  These  enterprises,  neither  public  nor
private, in fact come under various systems of property ownership: they are sometimes
state enterprises,  sometimes collective enterprises,  sometimes private enterprises 1.
The goal of the author is not only to show that the policies implemented to promote
the development of these enterprises have differed from one place to another in China,
but also to explain why. To do this, he examines four big cities: Peking, Shanghai, Xi’an
and Guangzhou. He has hunted through the local press, read the administrative reports
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or the development plans for this sector of activity, and conducted over a hundred
meetings with  entrepreneurs  as  well  as  representatives  of  the  administrative
departments concerned.
3 To understand the variety of strategic choices operated by the authorities, Segal places
them  in  the  framework  of  local  economic  systems  that  he  characterises  by  four
elements:  the technological  and scientific  resources available,  the balance of  power
between  the  different  administrative  departments,  the  relations  between  the  local
government and the central authorities, and local traditions in the field of economic
policy. These four elements define an institutional configuration specific to the area
under consideration, which, he concludes, has fashioned the local path that has been
taken when it comes to the promotion of the high-tech enterprises. The heart of the
work is  thus  formed by the chapters  in  which the author reconstitutes  these  local
trajectories. Each time, the author directs his questions at three aspects: the legal form
(the system of property) adopted by the enterprises, the type of financing that has been
implemented, and the relationship between the local government and the enterprises.
Studying the emergence of the same sector of activity at several points on Chinese soil,
the author logically associates the characteristics of the local system with the success
or failure of the promotion of the high-tech industries.
4 Some of the results of the survey may well come as a surprise. For example, contrary to
the received idea that the government is omnipresent in Peking, Segal reveals that the
high-tech enterprises have developed in a way that has been largely independent of the
central authorities. It is only in a second phase, after their initial success, that the local
government and the State Council have set up a zone at Zhongguancun where these
enterprises  are  given a  privileged welcome.  This  trajectory  is  very  obviously  to  be
placed  in  the  context  of  the  characteristics  of  the  local  economic  system.  Peking
benefits  from  the  largest  concentration  of  universities  and  other  public  research
institutes, yet at the same time the tools of industrial planning are less developed here
than in other cities such as Shanghai. In that city, the development of the high-tech
industries has been concentrated around the large state enterprises. The situation is
comparable in Xi’an, where the local economy is dominated by state enterprises and
the defence industries. For its part, Guangzhou has logically appealed to foreign capital,
in particular to entrepreneurs from Hong Kong.
5 In her work, Kellee S. Tsai examines the contribution made by informal financing to
China’s growth (70% of the enterprises at which she conducted surveys have resorted
to one form or another of informal financing: collateral loans, tontine schemes, loans
from family or friends, etc.). The three questions at the core of the work are: how can
the wide dissemination of informal modes of financing be explained while they are
actually  illegal?  Why  does  the  informal  financing  on  offer  vary  from  one  place  to
another in China? Why, in the same local area, do private entrepreneurs have different
ways  of  accessing  this  financing?  Tsai  looks  not  only  at  the  diversity  of  the  local
situations, but also at the varying usage that private entrepreneurs make of the same
financing resources available within a given territory.
6 The argument is supported by a work that covers a considerable amount of terrain and
involves  more  than  twenty  months  of  research  conducted  between  1994  and  2001
(which  gives  Tsai  the  authority  to  comment  on  developments  (2),  three  hundred
interviews with private entrepreneurs, executive officers of banks and administrative
departments, in eighteen different locations in the provinces of Fujian, Zhejiang and
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Henan. The scope of the sampling allows certain hypotheses to be verified statistically
(correlation tests). Thus, in sixteen of the eighteen localities investigated, the attitude
of the local government towards the private sector (repressive or favourable) explains
the degree of institutional diversity when it comes to informal financing.
7 The data also reveals that the strategy of individual entrepreneurs where financing is
concerned  depends  on  the  length  of  their  experience,  the  scope  of  their  political
relations,  their  residential  origins  as  well  as  their  sex.  Tsai  thus  also  stresses  the
diversity  of  the  private  entrepreneurs  themselves.  If,  under  given  conditions,  they
make  different  use  of  the  modes  of  financing  available,  it  is  because  each  one  is
characterised by a different political and social identity. Thus, an entrepreneur who
enjoys  solid  political  relations  will  be  more  disposed  to  mobilise  the  formal  credit
system than a migrant woman possessing few points of contact in the local society.
8 The response that Tsai gives to the hypothesis of a “developmentalist” Chinese state,
even local, consists in what she calls the “the local logics of economic possibility”. The
author  emphasises  both  the  importance  of  the  heritage  of  the  Maoist  period  (the
presence of state enterprises or powerful collective institutions) and the initiative of
the  entrepreneurs  who,  though  certainly  embedded  in  the  given  local  structures,
nevertheless possess capacities for innovation in the use of  the available resources.
What  matters  for  the  understanding  of  the  processes  underway  are  thus  less  the
impulses given by the central government than the local configurations that are in
place.
9 Naturally enough, the two works share the same comparative method, which stresses
the break-up of Chinese territory into several parts. This choice allows two dangers to
be avoided, one being abstract and misleading generalisations on the scale of a country
that contains so many contrasts,  the other the impasses of a pure monograph. The
chosen  method  is  extremely  fruitful  here  and  allows  both  authors  to  construct  a
number of  typologies:  four modes of  development for the high-tech enterprises for
Adam Segal (p. 18); and three development models in the informal financial sector for
Kellee Tsai (p. 256).
10 The authors also insist on the necessity of deconstructing the central state as well as
the local governments. The Chinese state is not to be considered as a coherent machine
that marches to the beat of the same drum. One would search in vain for a central
Chinese administration that would be the equivalent of  Japan’s MITI or Singapore’s
EPD. In China, it  is necessary to envisage the state as a decentralised structure, yet
“embedded” in specific institutional, political and social configurations. Adam Segal is
interested precisely in the interactions between the local and central echelons. Kellee
Tsai clearly demonstrates that at the level of the same city the Bank of China and the
Bureau  of  Industry  and  Commerce  can  have  divergent  interests  (while  the  former
wishes to suppress the informal types of credit, the latter may actively support them,
as collateral loan agencies or credit co-operatives are sources of revenue). At each level
– national, provincial, municipal, district or village – the party-state is composed of
administrative  and  political  organs  that  work  in  co-operation  with  but  are
simultaneously rivals to each other.
11 Another conclusion common to the two works is the weight exerted by the past. Adam
Segal evokes the “traditional patterns of industrial policy” which vary from one area to
another  and  help  to  explain  the  capacity  of  local  governments  to  formulate  and
implement an industrial policy. Kellee Tsai stresses the Maoist heritage, a factor that
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structures local logics. Where the state did not organise economic development during
the  Maoist  period,  the  private  economy  is  active  (as  in  Wenzhou)  and  the  local
authorities are agreeable to the creation of new forms of financing 3.
12 Certainly, the reading of the two works leaves something to be desired. Adam Segal
does  not  furnish,  for  example,  any  indices  of  the  economic  or  technological
performance of the enterprises under consideration. To what extent are these Chinese
high-tech companies genuinely innovative? Do a number of them not merely content
themselves with assembling parts, extensively imported, and are they thus not simple
manufacturing enterprises? Has China not planted its territory with technology parks
(gaokexue yuan) that, when they are not deserted, primarily welcome enterprises on the
look-out  for  tax  exemptions  and easy  access  to  credit?  Is  the  comparison between
Zhongguancun  and  Silicon  Valley  in  California  relevant  (the  thought  here  is  in
particular  directed  at  the  question  of  the  circulation  of  information  between
enterprises with links to universities or contributing research centres)? Kellee Tsai, for
her part, sometimes tries her reader’s patience with the immensity of the literature of
sociology,  economics,  anthropology  and  political  science  that  she  draws  on  (is  the
reference to the habitus of Pierre Bourdieu, p.  259, really necessary?).  Despite these
comments, the two authors offer a considerable wealth of results and open up a path
that is full of promise.
NOTES
1.On this point, see Bennis Wai-yip So, “Evolution of Minying High-tech Enterprises in
China: Legitimizing Private Ownership”, Issues& Studies, vol. 37, No. 5, September-
October 2001, pp. 76-99, and our article “The Incomplete Crystallisation of the Private
Sector”, China Perspectives, No. 42, July-August 2002, pp. 24-35.
2.The creation in 1984 in Wenzhou of the first bank that was closed in 1989 for example
(pp. 140 ff.).
3.That is not to say that in the areas where the local administration continues to
entertain very close links with state or collective enterprises private entrepreneurs for
whom access to formal credit is difficult do not display a great capacity for innovation
in terms of financing. This is the case in the province of Henan, where although the
private sector is relatively underdeveloped, there is a great variety in the types of
informal financing.
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